Primum non nocere (Above all, do no harm) surely occupies a venerable position among the principles of medical ethics. In fact, it is not uncommonly referred to as the first and most important principle governing the ethics of the medical profession: "And the prime rule for the physican must be, as always, primum non nocere" [1] . Physician Bernard Meyer claims that traditionally medicine has been guided by the precept "Do no harm" which transcends even the virtue of uttering truth for its own sake [2] . In a discussion of truth-telling in medicine, Robert Veatch concludes that the prevention of harm is probably the dominant, normative ethical theory operating in medicine today [3] .
In this essay I will argue not only that "Do no harm" should be dethroned as the first principle of medical ethics, but also that it did not belong on the throne in the first place. An examination of the historical roots and philosophical foundations of this famous and oft-quoted maxim will show that primum utilis esse (Above all, be useful) should instead be acknowledged as the first principle of medical ethics. The concept of usefulness is an integral part of the very meaning of medicine and of the physician-patient relationship. The requirement that physicians above all be useful to their patients can itself prove more useful in locating exits from the labyrinth of certain ethical problems in medicine than the famous injunction to avoid doing harm.
THE HIPPOCRATIC BACKGROUND
The Latin expression primum non nocere has been widely accepted as the most senior and significant principle of medical ethics. The source of primum non nocere is usually thought to be the Hippocratic Oath. However, the Oath does not contain this 655 expression, though it does have a statement which is somewhat similar: "I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but I will never use it to injure or wrong them" [4] . Neither this nor any other section of the Oath makes mention that the physican ought not harm the patient "above all." This particular statement in the Oath simply says that the physician should attempt to help or benefit the patient by using medical treatments and to refrain from using these treatments to harm or wrong the patient. If the physician can be said to have a first duty, it would likely be to benefit the patient by means of positive therapeutic actions rather than to merely abstain from harmful action. A physician who only avoided harming patients and never did anything of definite benefit for them would not really be practicing medicine, which ultimately must aim at making the sick better.
The precise phrase "Do no harm" appears in the Hippocratic treatise The Epidemics (translated literally and somewhat roughly): "To practice about diseases, two things: to help or not to harm" [5] . Other translations of this phrase from The Epidemics are "to do good or to do no harm" [6] , "to be useful or not to damage" [7] , and (Jones' popular version) "to help, or at least to do no harm" [4] . According to Jonsen [5] , the Greek text itself offers no justification for the emphatic "above all" phrase which the Latin version of the Hippocratic expression possesses or for Jones' addition of "at least." The precise origin of primum non nocere as a conjoined phrase is unknown, but a prominent medical historian believes that it is rooted in the Hippocratic text quoted above [5] . Galen Primum non nocere not only forsakes its Hippocratic lineage, but it also proves to be a less fitting and useful principle in the actual practice of medicine than its suggested successor, primum utilis esse. In the clinical setting, the sick people we call patients want first and above all to be helped. Louis Lasagna has suggested that the proper medical and moral stance for today's physician is not to avoid harm at all costs, but to optimize treatment [8] . Keeping patients from harm is surely not irrelevant to medicine, but it should not be medicine's primary concern and most fundamental orientation. The concept of usefulness has not yet received the attention in discussions of the teleology and ethics of medicine that it properly deserves. "Above all, be useful" more faithfully represents the original Hippocratic ideal and present clinical reality of medical practice.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF USEFULNESS IN MEDICINE
The principle "Above all, be useful" rests implicitly at the very heart of the physician-patient relationship. People visit physicians when they are sick, and not plumbers or truck drivers, precisely because there is (or should be) good reason for them to believe that the physician can be of definite help to them in their efforts to be rid of the sickness afflicting them. A sick person comes to a physician because the latter possesses knowledge and skills which the patient needs in order to regain health and wholeness. Yet not all sick people can be helped by physicians and made well. Some diseases and illnesses (as well as some persons' lifestyles) are beyond the therapeutic reach of even the most sophisticated and technologically advanced medical prowess. If one considers death to be a necessary and fitting part of the human condition, then there is at least one health "problem" which medicine should not even attempt to solve [9] . Nonetheless, even in the midst of medical fallibility, ignorance, and error, no one can properly be called a physician who cannot offer healing and caring, to one degree or another, to those suffering from disease. Above all, then, physicians should be able to help the sick.
The requirement that physicians should first of all attempt to help the sick has its own tradition vividly expressed in the various oaths medical practitioners have sworn throughout the ages. Two different sections of the traditional Hippocratic Oath and its Christian counterpart mention that the physician is to work for "the benefit of the sick." The Hippocratic treatise Precepts echoes the Oath by enjoining the physician "to prescribe what will help towards a bure, to heal the patient," and the text of another treatise, Ancient Medicine, flatly states that "the art of medicine. . was discovered for the treatment of the sick" [4] . The medical student's oath found in the Charaka Samkita manuscript of ancient India addresses the issue of benefit in very explicit terms: "Day and night, however thou mayest be engaged, thou shalt endeavor for the relief of patients with all thy heart and soul." The Glasgow Oath also emphatically binds the physician to helping patients: "I will exercise the several parts of my profession, to the best of my knowledge and abilities, for the good, safety, and welfare of all persons committing themselves, or committed to my care and direction" [10] . The Nostrums and Quackery which exposed the numerous fake remedies and phony practitioners available at the time. The preface to this 693-page tome exclaims: "When the veil of mystery is torn from the medical fakes, the naked sordidness and inherent worthlessness that remains suffices to make quackery its own greatest condemnation" [12] . A more contemporary example of medical concern over quackery is found in the laetrile controversy. One physician has recently suggested that the "true ethics of American medicine" does not allow physicians to idly observe thousands of desperate cancer patients being exposed to a drug of "unknown effectiveness, unknown safety and poor manufacturing quality" [13] . He warns that the image of the physician will "scarcely be enhanced if we stand imperiously on our ivory towers while they [the American public] wallow in a mire of uncontrolled quackery." A tightly controlled clinical trial of laetrile, he suggests; seems the most ethical and humane thing for medicine to do to remedy the current situation. From this point of view, medicine has a positive moral duty to expose quackery by subjecting its alleged remedies to the rigor of scientific validation.
Laws licensing physicians are designed to permit only scientifically trained and qualified persons to practice medicine and to prevent quacks from bilking the public with phony cures. Daniel Callahan has rightly observed that the purpose of these laws is not only to protect the public from incompetent physicians, but also to protect physicians themselves from the presence in their midst of untrained, unqualified quacks [14] . The Even the most commonly used agents such as quinidine, digitalis, the thiazides, and hormonal agents such as thyroid, insulin, steroids, and progestins carry considerable risk ... In the use of many drugs, the upper therapeutic range is perilously close to the level that causes toxic and other untoward effects [15] .
Most drugs, then, are legitimately called therapeutic because they are expected to do more good than harm (though some kind of harm-pain, discomfort, organ dysfunction, etc.-is also expected). Therefore, on balance they will benefit the patient and be useful in restoring health.
The example of drug therapy reflects an important component of medical practice: many, if not most, diagnostic and therapeutic maneuvers are only proportionately useful to the patient, that is, they almost universally carry the threat of harm as well as the promise of benefit. Often these procedures actually do produce harm of one kind or another, e.g., anti-cancer drugs frequently cause nausea and vomiting. If physicians were to strictly adhere to primum non nocere, a great many of medicine's tools would be permanently banned. If physicians should strive above all to do no harm (above even producing proportionate benefit), then medicine would have to abandon much of what is presently held to be appropriate, standard therapy. In treating patients, physicians are forced to make judgments about which surgery, procedures, and drugs are likely to yield the most benefit and the least harm. The Hippocratic work Joints contains a passage which reflects the ancient tradition behind this practice: "What you should put first in all the practice of our art is how to make the patient well; and if he can be made well in many ways, one should choose the least troublesome. This is more honorable, and more in accord with the art" [16] . Medicine [19] . In sum, even though randomized clinical trials cannot always be done [24] [25] [26] , medicine should make every reasonable effort to verify empirically the clinical usefulness of its practices, especially since once a practice becomes popular (for whatever reason), it is hard to abandon. The controversies surrounding laetrile [13] , universal fetal heart monitoring [27] , and coronary-artery bypass graft surgery [28] [29] [30] In ordinary medical practice, the goals of treatment are generally obvious to both physician and patient and accepted without question, and it is not uncommon for neither party to specifically articulate these goals. The car accident victim wants his lacerations sutured to prevent excessive blood loss, his broken limbs set properly so he can use them again, and his pain relieved. The pregnant woman intending to carry to term wants to deliver a healthy baby and be healthy herself before and after delivery. The person with strep throat wants the appropriate antibiotic to end the infection, and so on. In most cases of medical care, the purpose or goal of treatment is clear to both physician and patient, and both agree to take the actions necessary to secure that goal. However, with the confluence of certain kinds of diseases and certain kinds of persons having unique characters, value systems, preferences, fears, and prejudices, the goal of medical treatment in any one case may become quite obscure. The fallacy is to generalize from relatively easy, straightforward cases in which physicians' and patients' perceptions of the usefulness of treatment are congruent to those cases in which the issue of usefulness is quite complex, controversial, and open to multiple interpretations.
For example, which treatment for breast cancer is useful? The answer depends not only on whom you ask (physician or patient), but also on whose evidence you are willing to accept. All in all, the debate surrounding the "proper" or "best" treatment of breast cancer is certainly one of the most convoluted in medicine today [33] . Yet one thing can be clearly identified: the decision to have a radical mastectomy or a simpler, less drastic treatment involves a weighing of values that cannot be determined by scientific fact alone. A surgeon may believe that the most useful treatment is radical mastectomy, i.e., extensive surgery is the best way to contain the disease and maximize the length of survival, but an individual patient may not see it this way at all. She may rather assume a possibly greater risk of death and live with a less disfigured body by choosing the simpler treatment. Clearly, conceptions of what constitutes useful medical treatment (as in the case of breast cancer) can and do legitimately vary among both physicians and patients.
Physicians offer people a particular kind of benefit in consonance with their proper role as established by tradition, education, skill, and licensing. Individuals can be benefited in multiple ways, but not all of these are appropriate to the physician. A physician qua physician offers medical benefit to those in need of it; that is, physicians prevent, cure, and alleviate disease. In other words, physicians strive to restore, preserve, and enhance health. Although health and disease are troublesome and elusive concepts, they do at least roughly identify the proper concerns of the physician.
Even though exact definitions of sickness, disease, and health are still lacking, one thing can be said confidently: medicine should not do just anything to anyone upon demand from that person, another person, or society. A physician who would radiate, medicate, or manipulate someone merely upon request would be behaving in a grossly unprofessional and unethical manner. Persons demanding pills, hospitalization, surgical procedures, or diagnostic tests for their own purposes usually do not receive much assistance from conscientious physicians. There must be a legitimate medical reason present before physicians should medically intervene in someone's life-even if that person requests or demands their intervention. Medicine upon demand is unacceptable: it would disintegrate the integrity of the medical profession and inevitably produce great harm. Medical reasons must justify medical interventions which have an appropriate connection with mental/ physical health construed at least somewhat conservatively.
Both Pedro Lain Entralgo and Leon Kass suggest that the scope of action of the physician qua physician is becoming dangerously wide. According to them, the proper scope of medicine is the health of the sick person, not the goodness, happiness, pleasure, or gratification of the patient. "The proper function of the doctor as such is not to make men good or happy, but healthy. As a doctor, he can and ought to go no farther than this" [34] . Kass asserts that the pursuit of any goal other than health by physicians is a "perversion of the art," the goodness or worthiness of the goal notwithstanding [35] . He.gives some examples of practices which he believes are not acts of medicine: performing artificial insemination, arranging adoptions, performing vasectomies and abortions for non-medical reasons, dispensing antibiotics or other medications simply because the patient wants to take something, and some activities of psychiatrists and cosmetic surgeons. While one could argue that Kass is adopting an overly conservative view of health and the end of medicine, his concern over the ever increasing range of so-called medical interventions is more than justified. The ethician Paul Ramsey has also expressed concern over the conflict between the social use of medical instruments and the medical use of medical instruments [36] . It is not fanciful speculation to wonder if medicine itself is taking on the function of soma in Brave New World.
To modify a phrase of Ramsey's, the good things physicians do are made complete only by the things they refuse to do [36] . There are some things that physicians should not do because such actions would run counter to a basic norm inherent in the functioning of the physician qua physician. Edmund Pellegrino calls the canon of these norms "professional medical ethics"; it deals with the obligations of the special interrelationship between persons called the medical encounter which is independent of the problem for which the patient seeks assistance [37] . The proper domain of medicine, therefore, is composed of certain activities which are peculiarly useful in the protection and promotion of the health of human beings while the borders of this domain are formed by the principles of professional medical ethics which seek to insure the quality of the medical encounter and prevent the disintegration of medicine's integrity. Physicians must have some definite voice in determining what is useful medical treatment since they have to prescribe the pill, wield the knife, and bear the ethical and legal responsibility for what they do.
Professional medical ethics creates some boundaries for the domain of useful medical treatment, while the personal values of individual patients create others. In other words, as there are some things which physicians ought not to do for their patients, there are some things which individual patients do not want done for them by physicians. As the breast cancer example indicates, the physician and the patient may have very different views on the usefulness of proposed treatment, and the patient may properly find the physician's assessment of the relative risks and benefits subjectively unacceptable. Patients must have a respected voice in determining the usefulness of medical treatment, since it is their bodies, their very selves, which must bear the consequences of the treatment.
Any decision to initiate, continue, or discontinue diagnostic or therapeutic action has both a medical and a personal value component, though in certain circumstances one should receive preference over the other. The former properly belongs to physicians and the latter to patients (depending upon circumstances, possibly to their families as well). Either one of these components alone is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for adequately justifying medical interventions. In other words, patients can and should place limits on what physicians can do to them, and physicians can and should place limits on what they will do for patients.
Any decision to stop medical treatment once it has begun also possesses these two essential ingredients. Such a decision does not belong exclusively to either physicians or patients, although many insist that it belongs only to one or the other group. Most of those writing about this issue tend to fall heavily on one side or the other. Physicians, as exemplified by the following three authors, are wont to insist that the decision to stop treatment is exclusively theirs. Franz Inglefinger, referring to the controversy over allowing defective newborns to die, states "the onus of decisionmaking ultimately falls on the doctor in whose care the child has been put" [38] . He suggests that the physician has the most valid prerogative to weigh the pros and cons of continuing measures that sustain the life of a hopelessly afflicted patient. Howard Lewis echoes the same position:
The decision to prolong life by artificial or other unusual measures in the face of what obviously appears to be a fatal illness is one of a physician's most difficult and lonely tasks. Consultation may be of great help to him, but in the last analysis only he must decide the issue [39] . Vincent Collins asserts "it is evident that prolonging life [is] not a theological or legal responsibility but clearly a medical responsibility" [40] . Collins, however, also comes out strongly against physicians doing what is useless in prolonging life.
To continue an act or proceed with therapy which produces no improvement, which does not achieve or have the potential to achieve "full human life," and which is demonstrably ineffective in its objectives, is imprudent, illogical, and irrational. This is the essence of medical practice.
While one wonders what he means by "full human life," it is cleaF that Collins understands the end of medicine to essentially involve benefit and demonstrable usefulness.
On the other side of the issue are those who hold that the decision to stop medical treatment is an ethical judgment belonging exclusively to patients or their families. Robert Veatch flatly states: "The physician should never be placed in the position of deciding to stop or omit treatment" [3] . He would likely defend this claim by suggesting that the determination of an expendable treatment and the circumstances under which treatment should be discontinued is "clearly a question of ethical and other value judgment" over which the physician has no expertise [41] . Thomas Shannon, another ethician, agrees with Veatch.
Although the patient's condition is a complex accumulation of medical facts and personal values, the decision to terminate or continue treatment is basically a moral or religious one and must take into account the patient's own perspective [42] .
Shannon criticizes existing guidelines for the care of the terminally ill for failing to make the distinction between medical and moral dimensions in the decision to terminate treatment. Since termination of treatment is a moral rather than a medical decision, he suggests that it properly belongs to the patient, not the physician. Support for this position has come from medical quarters too. Imbus and Zawacki have reported their experiences in a burn unit which has adopted the policy of allowing patients whose injuries are so severe that survival is not only unexpected, but also unprecedented, to decide whether or not they want to undergo maximal therapeutic effort. "Our approach ... is based on our conviction that the decision to begin or to withhold maximal therapeutic effort is more of an ethical than a medical judgment" [43] .
The assumption which all of these authors unfortunately make is that the decision to terminate medical treatment must be either medical and belong to the physician or ethical and belong to the patient. A position attempting to protect the integrity of both the medical profession and the persons it serves rejects such an "either-or" approach and recommends the use of a "both-and" methodology. ln I suggest that a workable physician-patient relationship could be constructed along these lines and that it be called a contractual fiduciary relationship. The notion of contract is included not with the intent of suggesting a businesslike relationship, but rather because it connotes that two equal parties are involved, both of whom have interests, rights, obligations, and the ability to place limits on the relationship. The fiduciary aspect recognizes the fact that the two parties are not equal, since the physician does possess the medical knowledge and skill which the patient lacks and needs and which require the patient to trust the physician. The physician should loyally work for the best interests of patients and allow patients to specify their own best interests rather than arbitrarily impose his or her own values on the patients.
In many cases of common medical practice, patients will not be active negotiators because they have no problem with their physician's determination of what is the most useful treatment for them. This is perfectly acceptable as long as the fact that many patients do not actively negotiate the fiduciary contract is not taken to mean that they never should have any voice in decisions affecting their medical treatment.
CONCLUSION
Practicing medicine with the intent of producing benefit and being useful to the patient is far more fundamental than practicing medicine to avoid harm. The first duty of physicians is to be useful to their sick and diseased patients. The goal of any medical procedure, however uncertain its actual achievement may be, must be identified before its usefulness can be determined. The justification for any decision to initiate, continue, or discontinue medical treatment must take into account both the medical and the personal (i.e., the patient's) perspectives on what will be useful treatment. Unless their professional ethics or their personal ethical convictions are being seriously threatened or compromised, physicians ought to accept their patients' notions of usefulness and alter their medical care accordingly, since, after all, it is each patient's own life and body which are directly affected by medical interventions. However, if a patient desires treatment which a physician conscientiously judges to be useless or otherwise in violation of his or her professional ethics or personal ethical convictions, then the physician ought not to provide that treatment, nor should he or she be forced by the state, hospital, or other institution to treat that patient. ' A great deal more discussion and argument than this essay can provide needs to be directed at these obviously controversial issues. Was the plastic surgeon who recently made an entertainer look like the late Elvis Presley behaving in a medically and ethically appropriate manner? Should surgeons perform hysterectomies upon demand or for birth control purposes? Can obstetricians properly refuse to care for welfare patients having numerous children unless they agree to be sterilized at the time of their delivery? Should physicians vigorously resuscitate a patient whose death is imminent at the request of a family member or even the patient himself? The answers to these questions contain the essence of the character and meaning of medicine. Ultimately, the integrity of physicians qua physicians rests on their ability to refuse to perform certain kinds of medically useless and ethically unjustifiable actions.
